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Abstract
Despite similar levels of per capita income, education, and technology the develop-
ment of labour shares in OECD countries has displayed diﬀ  erent patterns since 1960. 
The paper examines the role of demography in this regard. Employing an overlapping 
generations model we ﬁ  rst examine the mechanisms through which demographic 
change can aﬀ  ect labour shares. Model simulations show that demographic eﬀ  ects 
on the labour share are larger in open than in closed economies. Empirical estimates, 
conducted using panel cointegration techniques for a panel of 18 OECD countries, 
provide strong support for demographic eﬀ  ects on the labour share. In line with the 
simulation results, we also ﬁ  nd evidence that openness increases this impact.
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1   Introduction
After rising substantially in the 1960s and early 1970s, labour shares have been 
steadily declining ever since in most OECD countries. In a few countries however, 
despite similar levels of per capita income, education and technology, labour shares 
have remained relatively stable (Figure 1 for selected countries). There has been 
extensive research on factors that might have caused this phenomenon. It is widely 
argued in literature that the interplay of institutional labour market reforms and high real 
wage growth on the one hand and a slowdown in productivity growth caused by supply 
shocks on the other hand, lead to the rise in most European labour shares in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Bertoli and Farina, 2007). The following recovery of profit shares in the 
1980s is by many authors interpreted as a result of the reaction of firms who increased 
profit shares by reducing labour demand and through a shift to more capital-intensive 
production techniques (Blanchard, 1997).  
However, the question remains why in several countries labour shares have kept on 
falling since the 1980s when they returned to their initial levels of the 1960s. Given that 
the countries with declining labour shares are mostly continental European, labour 
market institutions are a natural candidate. However, labour share declines have taken 
place both in countries which reduced unemployment and others in which 
unemployment rates remained high. Likewise correlations between real wage growth 
and changes in labour shares have been quite small (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). 
This indicates that a potential common factor explaining the decline in labour shares 
should be consistent with differing labour market outcomes. Some other potential 
determinants that have been analysed in the recent empirical literature include sectoral 
composition effects (De Serres et al., 2001), labour saving technological change 
(Guscina, 2006), and the globalisation of trade and capital flows (Guscina, 2006; 
Jayadev, 2007).  
This paper examines the role of demography as a further potential explanation for the 
differences in labour share developments across OECD countries. The extent to which 
these countries are affected by demographic change differs considerably. While some 5
countries have seen steady population growth others experienced a substantial 
slowdown (Figure 2). Moreover, growing life expectancy has led to substantial 
increases in expected retirement durations if pension ages were not adjusted 
accordingly. As a result of both factors, old-age dependency ratios are projected to 
display largely differing developments until 2050 (Figure 3). This paper seeks to 
examine whether differences in demographic developments can explain some of the 
differences in labour share developments and also how demography affects labour 
shares. Our approach is therefore to conduct both model simulations and empirical 
estimations. By simulating demographic shocks in a neoclassical overlapping 
generations (OLG) framework we seek to identify the mechanisms and determinants of 
demographic change on labour shares. Based on these insights we then estimate the 
demographic impact on labour shares empirically using a panel of 18 OECD countries 
for the period from 1960 to 2008.  
To our knowledge, theoretical analysis of labour shares has so far only been 
conducted for closed economy frameworks and missed the potentially important impact 
of international capital mobility. Though closed economy models might be somewhat 
appropriate for large countries, open economy models are certainly more realistic for 
smaller countries. To provide for both cases, we conduct model simulations for closed 
as well as small open economy frameworks. To examine the role of pension systems, 
we also distinguish between economies with pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) or fully funded 
pension systems. We treat the model simulations as a preparatory exercise to identify 
possible mechanisms through which demography can affect labour shares, which are 
subsequently tested in empirical estimations. We therefore keep the OLG model very 
simple, assuming a 2-period life-cycle and simulating only steady state effects for 
different combinations of pension systems, openness and elasticities of substitution 
between capital and labour.  
The simulation results suggest that in closed economies a drop in labour force growth 
and higher expected retirement duration can affect labour shares by altering the capital 
intensity of production. Shifts in the capital intensity affect the labour share either 6
positively or negatively depending on the production function’s elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour. In a small open economy (SOE) framework with perfect 
capital mobility, however, interest rates are exogenous and the domestic capital 
intensity remains thus unaffected. Both, higher expected retirement duration and falling 
labour force growth rates can nevertheless decrease labour shares by creating a gap 
between domestic savings and domestic investments.
1 Since the domestic capital-
intensity is constant, excess savings are invested abroad. This improves the country’s 
net foreign asset position and generates higher foreign asset income by which the labour 
share is reduced independently of the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour. Moreover, demographic effects are slightly stronger in countries with PAYGO 
system as households adjust their saving behaviour to lower expected public pensions 
during retirement. 
Based on the simulation results, we then test the relationship between demographic 
change and the labour share empirically. Unit root tests show labour shares to be non-
stationary, a fact that has been widely neglected in the previous empirical literature on 
the labour share. Pedroni tests indicate cointegrating relationships between the labour 
share and several demographic variables. This allows us to employ a panel error 
correction model to detect the long-run effects of demographic change on the labour 
share. Referring to the simulation results, we also interact the demographic variables 
with openness and a pension system indicator to test whether these variables influence 
demographic effects on labour shares. The estimation results mostly confirm those of 
our model simulations. We find significant long-run relationships between all 
demographic variables and labour shares. These effects tend to be larger in open 
economies. The size of the PAYGO-financed component of the pension system, 
however, appears not to play a significant role.  
                                                          
1 The effect of demographic change on saving and investment behaviour as well as international capital flows has 
been subject to a number of theoretical and empirical studies (see Domeij and Flodén (2006) for an overview). 
Almost all of these suggest that differences in demographic trends have been an important determinant of 
international capital flows since WWII. 7
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the OLG 
model used to simulate demographic effects on labour shares. Section 3 contains the 
calibration and simulation results. Section 4 presents the data and empirical 
methodology, section 5 the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2   The model 
This section develops a 2-period OLG model in several variants that differ with 
regard to pension system and openness. Pension systems are either PAYGO or fully 
funded and economies are modelled either as closed or small open economies. The 
PAYGO and SOE variants of the OLG model are based on Pemberton (2000).
2.1  The closed economy variant 
In a closed economy, all savings are invested domestically. Changes in saving rates 
can affect the labour share by altering the capital intensity of production unless the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is equal to one. We show that the 
capital intensity depends on the representative household’s expected duration of 
retirement and the country’s labour force growth rate. General equilibrium is 
constructed via the production sector where, given labour and capital inputs, output and 
factor prices are determined by a CES production function.  
The labour share is defined as the ratio of labour income to total income. It therefore 
depends on factor prices (wage and profit rates) as well as endowments of labour and 
capital – in other words on the capital intensity of production. In a closed economy 











where w is the wage rate, r is the interest rate, L is the labour force, K is the domestic 
capital stock, and Y is total production.  
Given factor inputs of capital and labour, output and factor prices are determined by 
a representative firm that uses a standard CES production function in units of labour 
given by 
1 1
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where k = K/L is the capital intensity, the term A represents total factor productivity, 
the elasticity of substitution and  is a factor share parameter that allows the relative 
importance of capital and labour in production to vary. For simplicity we assume that A 
is constant and not affected by demographic change. Labour inputs grow at rate n per 
period: 
   0 (1 )
t
t L nL =+ . (3) 
We further assume 100% capital depreciation per period and static profit 
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The economy consists of overlapping generations of households with identical utility 
functions. Each household lives for a working period during which savings are 
accumulated, and with probability , 0<<1, for a second, retired, period, in which the 
household lives on its accumulated annuities. In a PAYGO system economy, retired 
households additionally receive public pensions which are financed by working 9
households. For simplicity, we assume no bequest. Households thus save only to 
provide for their own income during retirement.  
By choosing an optimal consumption path, households maximise their inter-temporal 
utility. As usual in life-cycle models, the trade-off between consumption in young or old 
age is determined by the ratio of interest rate and time preference rate, and by the degree 
of relative risk aversion. Preferences are additive and separable over time. For a 

















t c and 
O
t c are the consumption levels of a young and old household at time t. 
denotes the time preference rate and  the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Households can borrow and lend freely at rt. Since the average survival rate of each 
generation is , gross return on annuities is (1+r)/. Maximisation of lifetime 
consumption is subject to budget constraints which for an economy with PAYGO 
pension system are given by 
(1 )
Y
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where  is a constant wage tax rate paid by the young households. Old households live 
on the annuities which their generation saved during working age and which are 
distributed to all pensioners still alive. Assuming that the government runs a balanced 
PAYGO budget each period, every old household receives additionally a public pension 
that depends on the current young generation’s wages and the old-age dependency ratio 
/1+n, which equals the ratio of the country’s survival rate and labour force growth. The 
old-age dependency ratio is therefore determined by both demographic factors – the 10
survival probability and labour force growth. In a funded pension system economy  is 
zero and old households live only on their accumulated annuities.  
Since we assume no bequest motives, all savings are spent during retirement. The 










Higher individual savings increase the capital intensity. A drop in the labour force 
growth rate will also increase capital intensity as labour supply becomes scarce relative 
to capital. For an economy with a PAYGO pension system the young household’s 




























An increase in  has a positive effect on savings of young households who provide for a 
higher probability of living through a second retired period. Since in a funded pension 
system economy  is zero, saving rates are c.p. higher. 
2.2  The small open economy variant 
Next, we assume a small open economy and constant world interest rates which the 
economy takes as given. Capital is perfectly mobile but labour immobile. The domestic 
capital intensity and wage rate are thus constant as well and no longer depend on the 
domestic saving rate. A decrease in a country’s labour supply leads to lower demand for 
domestic investments because less capital is needed. In an open economy however 
domestic savings and investments no longer need to be equal. Additional capital for 
domestic production can be acquired from abroad and domestic excess capital invested 
abroad. Assuming immobility of labour, the only income from abroad is capital income. 11











where f denotes net foreign assets per domestic worker. Since the capital intensity is 
constant, changes in the labour force growth rate only affect the net foreign asset 
position. Countries experiencing a slowdown of labour force growth relative to the rest 
of the world should therefore see an improvement of their net foreign asset position. 
For the open economy framework we have to alter our definition of the labour share 
since now total income includes not only domestic income, but also net international 
factor payments. The labour share is now 
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From (12) it is obvious that higher capital returns from abroad reduce the labour share. 
Demographic change can therefore affect labour shares not only by altering the capital 
intensity of production (which is constant in a SOE) but also by increasing the share of 
capital invested abroad. Exogenous shifts in relative supply of labour and capital are no 
longer balanced by adjustments in factor prices. Changes in labour shares are therefore 
possible even if Cobb-Douglas production functions are used. 
3   Model calibration and simulation results  
We analyse the steady state effects of a rise in the expected retirement duration, a 
decrease in the labour force growth rate as well as the combined effects of both 
demographic factors. A rise in the expected retirement duration is modelled as an 
increase in the survival parameter , a decrease in labour force growth rate as a drop in 12
the labour force growth rate n. We conduct separate simulations for either closed or 
small open economies, either PAYGO or funded pension system economies, and 
economies with elasticity of substitution either lower or greater than one.
2 This gives us 
a total of 24 variants to be simulated.  
The parameter values used in the calibration of our model are set as follows: We 
interpret each period in the OLG model as lasting for 30 years. We set the survival 
parameter for the initial steady state  = 0.7 and the labour force growth rate to 1% per 
year implying n = 0.35 per period. Elasticities of substitution are either  = 0.9 in which 
case capital and labour are complements or  = 1.1 in which they are substitutes. Other 
parameter values are taken from the literature. The coefficient on capital  = 0.5 is taken 
from de la Croix and Michel (2002), the coefficient of relative risk aversion  = 2 from 
Heer and Maussner (2005) and the total factor productivity A = 100 from Fanti and Gori 
(2007). The private subjective discount rate  = 1/(1+) in OLG models ranges from 0.3 
(de la Croix and Michel 2002) to 0.75 (Ambler, 2000). We therefore set the time 
preference rate to  = 1 (implying  = 0.5). The wage tax rate for the variants with 
PAYGO pension system  = 0.18 from Pemberton (2000).  
Table 2 summarises the results of our simulations of demographic shocks for 
economies with varying combinations of pension systems, openness and elasticities of 
substitution between capital and labour. It firstly reports the initial steady state capital 
intensities and the resulting labour shares. Saving rates and capital intensities are higher 
in economies with fully funded pension system relative to economies with PAYGO 
system. The labour share is higher in funded system economies if  is 0.9 (lower than 1) 
and lower if  is 1.1 (greater than 1). The table then shows the adjustments of capital 
intensities and labour shares when the survival parameter  is lifted from 0.7 to 0.9 and 
when labour force growth is reduced to zero (n = 0). Additionally the combined effects 
of both demographic shocks are presented.  
                                                          
2 Since in closed economies labour shares are constant by definition if the elasticity equals one, this case is not 
simulated. 13
In the closed economy simulations all demographic shocks increase capital 
intensities. In line with the standard neo-classical growth model, a drop in labour force 
growth directly leads to higher capital intensity. A higher survival rate also increases the 
capital intensity by lifting saving rates of households who provide for a longer expected 
retirement period. This effect is to some extend muted by the lower interest rates 
resulting from increased capital supply.
3 The effect of higher capital intensity on labour 
shares is ambiguous and depends on whether the elasticity of substitution is greater or 
lower than one. Labour shares drop if  = 1.1. For  = 0.9, however, the demographic 
shocks lead to an increase of labour shares. The closed economy version of our model 
can therefore help to explain declining labour shares in countries only if  exceeds 
unity.
4  
For the simulations of the demographic shocks in small open economies we take the 
interest rate from the initial steady states of the respective closed economy variants as 
exogenous and constant. Unlike in closed economies, however, demographic change no 
longer entails wage increases in open economies as capital intensities are constant. 
Labour share adjustments are thus only driven by changes in net foreign asset income. 
Demographically induced excess savings are invested abroad which improves the 
country’s net foreign asset position and increases households’ foreign investment 
income. As table 2 shows, by increasing the share of households’ capital invested 
abroad, demographic shocks can thus lead to reductions in labour shares even if the 
production function’s elasticity of substitution is lower than one. In case of  = 1.1 
reductions in labour shares caused by demographic shocks are also substantially larger 
in open economies compared to the respective closed economy variants.  
The impact of the demographic shocks on labour shares is larger in economies with 
PAYGO pension system. This is because households increase their saving rates to 
                                                          
3 Demographic effects on interest rates are discussed in the literature evolving around the so-called asset meltdown 
hypothesis (e.g. Abel, 2001, 2003; Poterba, 2001; Brooks, 2002). 
4 Empirical estimates of  display mixed results. Rowthorn (1996) estimates  to be substantially lower than one in 
all OECD countries. Blanchard (1997) estimates  to be slightly greater than one in Continental European Countries 
and slightly lower than one in Anglo-Saxon Countries. Berthold et al. (2002) estimate  to be substantially greater 
than one in Germany and France and a Cobb-Douglas-like production structure in the US.  14
compensate for the expected loss of income from PAYGO-financed public pensions due 
to higher old-age dependency ratios. The effect is larger in open economies because the 
increase in saving is not mitigated by lower interest rates resulting from higher capital 
intensities.
5 A pension system reform that entails a switch from a PAYGO to a fully 
funded pension system should therefore also have an impact on labour shares. The 
effect’s direction would, however, again depend on the elasticity of substitution.  
The simulations suggest that diverging demographic developments may indeed have 
been a factor contributing to the differing developments of labour shares across regions. 
Increased expected retirement durations and dropping population growth rates can cause 
labour shares to decline, particularly in open economies.
6  
4   Data and empirical methodology 
To examine the links between demography and the labour share empirically we use a 
panel of 18 OECD countries covering annual data from 1960 to 2008.
7 For such type of 
data-sets time-series-cross-section methods are most efficient in exploring the 
information of the data’s time and cross section dimension.
8 To be consistent with the 
                                                          
5 Accordingly a possible “asset meltdown” problem is alleviated to the extent that capital is internationally mobile 
(Börsch-Supan et al., 2006). 
6 Another possible channel through which demographic change can influence labour shares is factor biased 
technological change. If a slowdown in labour force growth leads to an increasing scarcity of labour relative to 
capital, firms may react by either shifting production abroad or by using more labour-saving techniques. The latter 
allows firms to decrease the marginal product of labour at a given capital intensity (Blanchard, 1997). In our model 
an increase of the proportion of relatively capital-intensive methods of production would increase the coefficient on 
capital  and decrease the coefficient on labour (1-) which also causes the labour share to drop. The resulting effect 




















. It is obvious that 	ls/	 < 0. An increase in  reduces the labour share.  
7 We exclude a number of OECD countries from the sample which have been or still are at different levels of 
development. These are mostly Eastern European countries, such as Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, and also Korea, Israel, Mexico and Russia. Switzerland and New Zealand are 
also excluded due to lack of comparable data on labour shares, Luxemburg and Iceland due to idiosyncratic economic 
structures. Canada was also excluded as it was identified as an extreme outlier in all estimations which is 
problematic, particularly in the conducted Mean Group estimations 
8 See Breitung and Peseran (2005) for an overview. 15
model simulations we use the expected retirement duration, population growth rates
9
and expected old-age dependency ratios as demographic variables and also include 
measures for openness and the weight of PAYGO elements in the national pension 
system. As described in section 2, the old-age dependency ratio variable presents a 
combination of both other demographic factors. Other variables, typically used in labour 
share models, are not included as a correlation with demography seems not plausible.  
The labour share, unlike the wage share, also includes labour income of non-
employees (i.e. self-employed or family workers). Since the latter is not provided in 
national accounts, we follow the widely adopted approach of Gollin (2002) to adjust for 
labour income of non-employees by assuming that other categories of workers earn the 











where w is compensation of employees, L is the number of employees, N is total 
employment and GNI is Gross National Income at current market prices. Data are taken 
from the European commission’s AMECO database. 
To obtain a measure for the expected retirement duration E(RD)t we use data on life 
expectancy at age 40 (
40
t LE ) taken from OECD Health Data assuming that each year 
the average worker is 40 years old. Since these data are provided separately for males 
and females, we use each year’s respective employment share of men and women as 
weights to compute the average life expectancy. The expected retirement duration for 
each year is then obtained after adding 40 years and subtracting the official national  
retirement age applying to people at age 40 (RAt):
10  
                                                          
9 We take population growth rates instead of labour force growth rates because national statistical agencies have 
used different methods in compiling labour force data which are thus not strictly comparable between countries. 
Moreover changes in estimation methods by statistical agencies have led to numerous structural breaks in the time 
series of several countries. 
10 In some countries the retirement age for men and women differs. In that case we use the employment shares of 
men and women as weights to compute the average retirement age. Computing the official retirement age of those at 
age 40 for each year, we also look at the year the retirement reforms were enacted. Changes in official retirement age 
applying to those cohorts of pre-reform periods are ignored since at age 40 they were not yet aware of the changes in 
their retirement age applying to them. For example the Australian Social Security Act of 1991 entailed changes in 16
40 () 4 0 tt t E RD LE RA =+ − . 
The expected old-age dependency ratio E(ADR)t is computed as the average old-age 
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Since real time data for life expectancy at age 40 and old-age dependency ratios are not 
available, we assume that earlier projections equalled the data of 2006 (old-age 
dependency ratios) and 2009 (life expectancy at age 40). Population growth rates are 
computed using data from the OECD Factbook 2009. The ratio of exports plus imports 
to GDP is used as the measure for openness.
12 Constructing a variable that characterises 
the countries’ pension systems with regard to the importance of PAYGO financed 
elements in the national pension systems has proved to be difficult as national pension 
systems are often complex and differ substantially in numerous elements. Bloom et al. 
(2007) calculate for a large number of countries approximations of the PAYGO portion 
of the replacement rate for 3 years between 1961 and 2002. We linearly interpolate (and 
extrapolate for 1960 and 2002-2008) the missing values, aware that these time-series 
present only very rough estimates of the true weights of PAYGO elements in national 
pension policies.  
Descriptive statistics of the variables are summarised in table 2. To get an impression 
of the properties of the data and to avoid spurious regressions we first perform panel 
unit root tests for all variables. To account for the possibility of cross-section 
dependence we use the CIPS statistic of Pesaran (2007). Following Pesaran we report 
test statistics based on CADF regressions with four different lag lengths. As shown in 
table 3, the null of a unit root can be rejected at the five percent level for the labour 
share only for the statistic with 1 or 2 lags and cannot be rejected in all other cases and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
retirement age for women born after July 1935 thus applying to those cohorts of women at age 40 since 1975. 
However, we do not adjust the retirement age for women at age 40 before 1991 when the reform was enacted. 
11 Projected data on old-age dependency ratios until 2050 were taken from OECD Social Indicators.
12 Data were also taken from the AMECO database. 17
for all other variables. Next, we test for cointegration between the labour shares and the 
above mentioned demographic variables as well as the openness variable, the PAYGO 
variable and the interaction terms. In tables 4 and 5 three cointegration tests of Pedroni 
(1999, 2004) are reported. We conduct the Panel-ADF and Group-ADF tests because 
Hlouskova and Wagner (2007) find in a simulation study that both tests perform better 
than other panel cointegration tests. In addition, we report the Group-Rho statistic 
because Pedroni (2004) shows that this test is the most conservative in small samples. 
Overall, these tests indicate a cointegrating relationship between the labour share and 
the explanatory variables included in the regressions. 
These results allow us to estimate error correction models to detect long-run effects. 
To find the appropriate specification we proceed in the following steps. Firstly, the lag 
order of the explanatory variables is determined by the Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion. Secondly, a Hausmann test is used to analyse whether coefficients are 
homogeneous across cross sections. We start from the most restricted model which is a 
fully homogenous model. This is tested against a model with heterogeneous constants 
and a model with heterogeneous short-run coefficients. If one of the later is superior, it 
is tested against a fully heterogeneous model. The model with heterogeneous short-run 
coefficients is estimated using the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator (Pesaran et al., 
1999) and the fully heterogeneours model using the Mean Group (MG) estimator 
(Pesaran, Smith, 1995).
13 Finally, we use the Breusch-Pagan test to detect cross section 
correlation. In the case of cross section correlation we use the seemingly-unrelated 
(SUR) estimator and otherwise OLS. From our estimation results we compute the long-
run elasticities and the corresponding standard errors.
14
                                                          
13 The MG estimator is the only consistent estimator if long-run coefficients are heterogeneous. However, it 
requires balanced panels and is extremely vulnerable to outliers. Therefore, in some estimations we had to remove a 
few more countries from the sample (see footnotes in tables 4 and 5). In two cases, in which the PMG estimator was 
used, extreme outliers were also removed. 
14 De Boef and Keele (2005) show how the standard errors of the long-run elasticities can be computed. 18
5   Empirical results 
Table 4 shows the estimated long-run elasticities with respect to labour shares. It 
turns out that in all specifications the fully homogenous model and the fixed effects 
model are rejected. Therefore, all models are estimated using either the PMG or the MG 
estimator. First we estimate the elasticities for all demographic variables individually 
(columns 1-3). The estimated long-run elasticities are highly significant and have the 
expected signs, which are negative for the expected retirement duration and the 
expected old-age dependency ratio and positive for the population growth rate.  
Next, we add openness as a further explanatory variable. While the elasticities of the 
demographic variables are hardly affected, openness is only significant if population 
growth is included as the demographic variable. This indicates that the negative 
relationship between globalisation of trade and the labour share found in most studies 
(e.g. Guscina (2006) and Jayadev (2007)) may in fact not be attributable to Stolper-
Samuelson effects on relative factor prices or higher elasticities of labour demand in 
wage bargaining models (e.g. Rodrik, 1997) but to demographically induced 
international capital flows. Column 6 shows that if the expected retirement duration and 
population growth are both included, population growth is no longer significant. This is 
also interesting as it implies that a retirement policy that links the retirement age to live 
expectancy can stabilise the labour share even if the population growth rates declines. 
To examine the role of the pension system we then include the PAYGO variable instead 
of openness (columns 8-10). The elasticities of the PAYGO variable are not significant 
which indicates that pension reforms alone do not affect labour shares.  
We then re-estimate the models from columns 4-6 and 8-10, this time including 
interaction terms between the demographic variables and the openness and PAYGO 
variables. The long-run elasticities of the interaction terms are reported in table 5. The 
results of the model simulations in section 3 suggested that demographic impacts should 
be larger in open economies. The coefficients of the expected retirement duration and 
the expected old-age dependency ratio interacted with openness are indeed negative and 
significant which gives support to the simulation results. The interaction term of 19
population growth and openness has the expected positive sign but is not significant. 
The elasticities of the interactions of the demographic variables with the PAYGO 
variable are again not significant which might indicate that the pension system is indeed 
not an important element in this regard. Given the very approximate construction of the 
PAYGO variable this result should, however, be treated with caution. 
6   Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates that the diverging patterns of labour share developments in 
OECD countries also reflect their demographic differences. Employing a stylized OLG 
model we show how demographic change leads to adjustments of households’ saving 
and investment behaviour. This in turn can affect labour shares by either altering 
domestic capital intensities or the share of net income from foreign assets. Anticipating 
higher retirement durations or lower PAYGO-financed public pensions due to higher 
old-age dependency ratios, households increase their saving rates. As a result, domestic 
capital intensities are increased and interest rates reduced. Households adjust to the 
expected loss of capital returns by investing a growing share of their savings in 
countries which are less affected by ageing and can thus provide higher interests on 
capital. In return, higher net foreign assets income reduces the country’s labour share. A 
decline in labour shares in ageing countries – in the public debate often regarded as a 
distributive problem – can thus also be attributed to provident behaviour of households.  
In subsequent empirical estimations we find evidence for these causal relationships. 
Effects of demographic change on the labour share are indeed significant and tend to be 
larger in open countries. Our findings also suggest that a country with decreasing 
population growth rates can keep a stable labour share if the country’s retirement age is 
adjusted continuously to its growing life expectations.  20
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Appendix 
Figure 1 
Labour shares in selected OECD countries (1960 = 100) 
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Figure 2 
Population growth in selected OECD countries (1960 = 100) 
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Figure 3 
Old-age dependency ratios in selected OECD countries  
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Table 1 
Simulation results: Steady state capital intensities and labour shares before and 
after demographic shocks  
Elasticity of substitution   = 1.1    = 0.9 
Pension System  PAYGO Funded PAYGO Funded 
Initial Steady State Capital Intensity 
( = 0.7, n = 0.35)  5.34  14.87  10.20  43.22 
Initial Steady State Labour Share 
( = 0.7, n = 0.35)  0.46  0.43  0.56  0.59 
Closed Economy      
Capital Intensity ( = 0.9)  11.11  29.69  23.11  82.98 
Capital Intensity (n = 0 )  14.21  38.89  31.21  117.19
Capital Intensity ( = 0.9, n = 0 )  29.55  77.68  63.11  201.39 
Labour Share (  =  0.9)  0.44 0.42 0.58 0.61 
Labour Share (n = 0 )  0.43  0.41  0.59  0.61 
Labour Share ( = 0.9, n = 0 )  0.42  0.39  0.60  0.62 
Small Open Economy     
Labour Share (  =  0.9)  0.40 0.38 0.50 0.55 
Labour Share (n = 0 )  0.38  0.36  0.48  0.53 
Labour Share ( = 0.9, n = 0 )  0.32  0.31  0.42  0.49 27
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables (1960-2008) 
   Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum Observations 








0.34 0.09  0.64 0.19  756 
Population 
growth 
0.59 0.53  4.48 -2.05  864 
Openness 0.59  0.33  1.84  0.09  882 
PAYGO   0.57  0.29  1.43  0.00  861 28
Table 3 
CIPS (Pesaran, 2007) Panel Unit Root Test Statistics  
   Number  of  Lags     
    p=0  p=1  p=2  p=3  N    T  
Labour Share  Intercept, Trend  -2.574  -2.845**  -2.766** -2.525 18  43
Exp. retirement duration   Intercept, Trend   -2.424  -1.814  -1.974  -2.137 11  43
Population growth  Intercept -1.724  -2.261  -1.657  -1.938 18  44
Exp. old-age dep. ratio   Intercept, Trend  -1.043  -1.486  -1.890  -1.937 12  43
Openness Intercept,  Trend  -1.933  -2.538  -2.161  -2.270 18  45
Exp. retirement duration × Openness  Intercept, Trend  -1.985  -2.115  -2.252  -2.158 11  43
Population growth × Openness  Intercept -1.781  -2.330  -1.727  -1.977 18  44
Exp. old-age dep. Ratio × Openness  Intercept, Trend  -2.089  -2.433  -2.146  -2.174 12  43
Exp. retirement duration × PAYGO  Intercept, Trend  -1.302  -1.068  -1.305  -1.413 11  43
Population growth × PAYGO  Intercept -1.563  -2.069  -1.479  -1.768 17  44
Exp. old-age dep. Ratio × PAYGO  Intercept, Trend  -1.302  -1.068  -1.305  -1.413 11  43
*, **, *** Null hypothesis of unit root rejected at the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % significance level respectively. 
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Table 4 
Long-run elasticities with respect to the labour share 






  -0.431 
(0.011) 
















dep. ratio  
   -0.211 
(0.065) 
   -0.219 
(0.065)
   -0.061 
(0.004)








   






Observations  690 826 573








3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2,2  3,2,2  3,2,2 3,2,2 3,2,2 3,2,2 3,2,2 
Model  PMG PMG MG  PMG PMG MG  MG  PMG  MG  MG 
Estimation  SUR  SUR  LS  LS  SUR  LS LS LS SUR  SUR 
Cointegration                






















   Group-Rho  2.85
*** 2.99
*** 1.02  4.40
*** 1.48  1.77
* 3.89
*** 2.23
*** 1.47 0.31 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % significance level respectively.  
1Finland, Greece, Italy, Spain, UK were excluded 
2Austria, Finland, Italy, Spain, UK were excluded 
3Austria, Finland were excluded 30
Table 5 
Long-run elasticities of interaction terms with respect to the labour share 
   (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 




      




     
Exp. old-age dep. ratio × 
Openness 
   -0.443 
(0.119) 
    
Exp. retirement duration × 
PAYGO  
     -0.177 
(0.191) 
  
Population growth × 
PAYGO  
     0.068 
(0.168) 
Exp. old-age dep. ratio × 
PAYGO  
      -0.001 
(0.838) 
Observations  690 826




Order of ARDL  3,2,2,2 3,2,2,2 3,2,2,2 3,2,2,2 3,2,2,2  3,2,2,2 
Model  PMG PMG MG  PMG  MG  MG 
Estimation  LS SUR  LS LS  SUR  LS 
Cointegration         














   Group-Rho  4.32
** 2.21




*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % significance level respectively.  
1Finland, Greece, Italy, Spain, UK were excluded 
2Austria, Finland, Italy, Spain, UK were excluded 
3Austria, Finland were excluded 